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GOLD & ECONOMIC FREEDOM
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An almost hysterical antagonism toward THE GOLD STANDARD is one
issue which unites statists of all persuasions. They seem to
sense--perhaps more clearly and subtly than many consistent
defenders of laissez-faire--that gold and economic freedom are
inseparable, that the gold standard is an instrument of
laissez-faire and that each implies and requires the other.
In order to understand the source of their antagonism, it is
necessary first to understand the specific role of gold in a free
society.
Money is the common denominator of all economic transactions. It
is that commodity which serves as a medium of exchange, is
universally acceptable to all participants in an exchange economy
as payment for their goods or services, and can, therefore, be
used as a standard of market value and as a store of value, i.e.,
as a means of saving.
The existence of such a commodity is a precondition of a division
of labor economy. If men did not have some commodity of objective
value which was generally acceptable as money, they would have to
resort to primitive barter or be forced to live on
self-sufficient farms and forgo the inestimable advantages of
specialization. If men had no means to store value, i.e., to
save, neither long-range planning nor exchange would be
possible.
What medium of exchange will be acceptable to all participants in
an economy is not determined arbitrarily. First, the medium of
exchange should be durable. In a primitive society of meager
wealth, wheat might be sufficiently durable to serve as a medium,
since all exchanges would occur only during and immediately after
the harvest, leaving no value-surplus to store. But where
store-of-value considerations are important, as they are in
richer, more civilized societies, the medium of exchange must be
a durable commodity, usually a metal. A metal is generally chosen
because it is homogeneous and divisible: every unit is the same
as every other and it can be blended or formed in any quantity.
Precious jewels, for example, are neither homogeneous nor
divisible.
More important, the commodity chosen as a medium must be a
luxury. Human desires for luxuries are unlimited and, therefore,
luxury goods are always in demand and will always be acceptable.
Wheat is a luxury in underfed civilizations, but not in a
prosperous society. Cigarettes ordinarily would not serve as
money, but they did in post-World War II Europe where they were
considered a luxury. The term "luxury good" implies scarcity and
high unit value. Having a high unit value, such a good is easily
portable; for instance, an ounce of gold is worth a half-ton of
pig iron.
In the early stages of a developing money economy, several media
of exchange might be used, since a wide variety of commodities
would fulfill the foregoing conditions. However, one of the
commodities will gradually displace all others, by being more
widely acceptable. Preferences on what to hold as a store of
value, will shift to the most widely acceptable commodity, which,
in turn, will make it still more acceptable. The shift is
progressive until that commodity becomes the sole medium of
exchange. The use of a single medium is highly advantageous for
the same reasons that a money economy is superior to a barter
economy: it makes exchanges possible on an incalculably wider
scale.
Whether the single medium is gold, silver, sea shells, cattle, or
tobacco is optional, depending on the context and development of
a given economy. In fact, all have been employed, at various
times, as media of exchange. Even in the present century, two
major commodities, gold and silver, have been used as
international media of exchange, with gold becoming the
predominant one. Gold, having both artistic and functional uses
and being relatively scarce, has always been considered a luxury
good. It is durable, portable, homogeneous, divisible, and,
therefore, has significant advantages over all other media of
exchange. Since the beginning of World War I, it has been
virtually the sole international standard of exchange.
If all goods and services were to be paid for in gold, large
payments would be difficult to execute, and this would tend to
limit the extent of a society's division of labor and
specialization. Thus a logical extension of the creation of a
medium of exchange, is the development of a banking system and
credit instruments (bank notes and deposits) which act as a
substitute for, but are convertible into, gold.
A free banking system based on gold is able to extend credit and
thus to create bank notes (currency) and deposits, according to
the production requirements of the economy. Individual owners of
gold are induced, by payments of interest, to deposit their gold
in a bank (against which they can draw checks). But since it is
rarely the case that all depositors want to withdraw all their
gold at the same time, a banker need keep only a fraction of his
total deposits in gold as reserves. This enables the banker to
loan out more than the amount of his gold deposits (which means
that he holds claims to gold rather than gold as security for his
deposits). But the amount of loans which he can afford to make is
not arbitrary: he has to gauge it in relation to his reserves and
to the status of his investments.
When banks loan money to finance productive and profitable
endeavors, the loans are paid off rapidly and bank credit
continues to be generally available. But when the business
ventures financed by bank credit are less profitable and slow to
pay off, bankers soon find that their loans outstanding are
excessive relative to their gold reserves, and they begin to
curtail new lending, usually by charging higher interest rates.
This tends to restrict the financing of new ventures and requires
the existing borrowers to improve their profitability before they
can obtain credit for further expansion. Thus, under the gold
standard, a free banking system stands as the protector of an
economy's stability and balanced growth.
When gold is accepted as the medium of exchange by most or all
nations, an unhampered free international gold standard serves to
foster a world-wide division of labor and the broadest
international trade. Even though the units of exchange (the
dollar, the pound, the franc, etc.) differ from country to
country, when all are defined in terms of gold the economies of
the different countries act as one--so long as there are no
restraints on trade or on the movement of capital. Credit,
interest rates, and prices tend to follow similar patterns in all
countries. For example, if banks in one country extend credit too
liberally, interest rates in that country will tend to fall,
inducing depositors to shift their gold to higher-interest paying
banks in other countries. This will immediately cause a shortage
of bank reserves in the "easy money" country, inducing tighter
credit standards and a return to competitively higher interest
rates again.
A fully free banking system and fully consistent gold standard
have not as yet been achieved. But prior to World War I, the
banking system in the United States (and in most of the world)
was based on gold, and even though governments intervened
occasionally, banking was more free than controlled.
Periodically, as a result of overly rapid credit expansion, banks
became loaned up to the limit of their gold reserves, interest
rates rose sharply, new credit was cut off, and the economy went
into a sharp, but short-lived recession. (Compared with the
depressions of 1920 and 1932, the pre-World War I business
declines were mild indeed.) It was limited gold reserves that
stopped the unbalanced expansions of business activity, before
they could develop into the post- World War I type of disaster.
The readjustment periods were short and the economies quickly
reestablished a sound basis to resume expansion.
But the process of cure was misdiagnosed as the disease: if
shortage of bank reserves was causing a business decline- argued
economic interventionists-why not find a way of supplying
increased reserves to the banks so they never need be short! If
banks can continue to loan money indefinitely--it was
claimed--there need never be any slumps in business. And so the
Federal Reserve System was organized in 1913. It consisted of
twelve regional Federal Reserve banks nominally owned by private
bankers, but in fact government sponsored, controlled, and
supported. Credit extended by these banks is in practice (though
not legally) backed by the taxing power of the federal
government. Technically, we remained on the gold standard;
individuals were still free to own gold, and gold continued to be
used as bank reserves. But now, in addition to gold, credit
extended by the Federal Reserve banks (paper reserves) could
serve as legal tender to pay depositors.
When business in the United States underwent a mild contraction
in 1927, the Federal Reserve created more paper reserves in the
hope of forestalling any possible bank reserve shortage. More
disastrous, however, was the Federal Reserve's attempt to assist
Great Britain who had been losing gold to us because the Bank of
England refused to allow interest rates to rise when market
forces dictated (it was politically unpalatable). The reasoning
of the authorities involved was as follows: if the Federal
Reserve pumped excessive paper reserves into American banks,
interest rates in the United States would fall to a level
comparable with those in Great Britain; this would act to stop
Britain's gold loss and avoid the political embarrassment of
having to raise interest rates.
The "Fed" succeeded: it stopped the gold loss, but it nearly
destroyed the economies of the world, in the process. The excess
credit which the Fed pumped into the economy spilled over into
the stock market--triggering a fantastic speculative boom.
Belatedly, Federal Reserve officials attempted to sop up the
excess reserves and finally succeeded in braking the boom. But it
was too late: by 1929 the speculative imbalances had become so
overwhelming that the attempt precipitated a sharp retrenching
and a consequent demoralizing of business confidence. As a
result, the American economy collapsed. Great Britain fared even
worse, and rather than absorb the full consequences of her
previous folly, she abandoned the gold standard completely in
1931, tearing asunder what remained of the fabric of confidence
and inducing a world-wide series of bank failures. The world
economies plunged into the Great Depression of the 1930's.
With a logic reminiscent of a generation earlier, statists argued
that the gold standard was largely to blame for the credit
debacle which led to the Great Depression. If the gold standard
had not existed, they argued, Britain's abandonment of gold
payments in 1931 would not have caused the failure of banks all
over the world. (The irony was that since 1913, we had been, not
on a gold standard, but on what may be termed "a mixed gold
standard"; yet it is gold that took the blame.)
But the opposition to the gold standard in any form--from a
growing number of welfare-state advocates--was prompted by a much
subtler insight: the realization that the gold standard is
incompatible with chronic deficit spending (the hallmark of the
welfare state). Stripped of its academic jargon, the welfare
state is nothing more than a mechanism by which governments
confiscate the wealth of the productive members of a society to
support a wide variety of welfare schemes. A substantial part of
the confiscation is effected by taxation. But the welfare
statists were quick to recognize that if they wished to retain
political power, the amount of taxation had to be limited and
they had to resort to programs of massive deficit spending, i.e.,
they had to borrow money, by issuing government bonds, to finance
welfare expenditures on a large scale.
Under a gold standard, the amount of credit that an economy can
support is determined by the economy's tangible assets, since
every credit instrument is ultimately a claim on some tangible
asset. But government bonds are not backed by tangible wealth,
only by the government's promise to pay out of future tax
revenues, and cannot easily be absorbed by the financial markets.
A large volume of new government bonds can be sold to the public
only at progressively higher interest rates. Thus, government
deficit spending under a gold standard is severely limited.
The abandonment of the gold standard made it possible for the
welfare statists to use the banking system as a means to an
unlimited expansion of credit. They have created paper reserves
in the form of government bonds which--through a complex series of
steps--the banks accept in place of tangible assets and treat as
if they were an actual deposit, i.e., as the equivalent of what
was formerly a deposit of gold. The holder of a government bond
or of a bank deposit created by paper reserves believes that he
has a valid claim on a real asset. But the fact is that there are
now more claims outstanding than real assets.
The law of supply and demand is not to be conned. As the supply
of money (of claims) increases relative to the supply of tangible
assets in the economy, prices must eventually rise. Thus the
earnings saved by the productive members of the society lose
value in terms of goods. When the economy's books are finally
balanced, one finds that loss in value represents the goods
purchased by the government for welfare or other purposes with
the money proceeds of the government bonds financed by bank
credit expansion.
In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect
savings from confiscation through inflation. There is no safe
store of value. If there were, the government would have to make
its holding illegal, as was done in the case of gold. If everyone
decided, for example, to convert all his bank deposits to silver
or copper or any other good, and thereafter declined to accept
checks as payment for goods, bank deposits would lose their
purchasing power and government-created bank credit would be
worthless as a claim on goods. The financial policy of the
welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of
wealth to protect themselves.
This is the shabby secret of the welfare statists' tirades
against gold. Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the
"hidden" confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this
insidious process. It stands as a protector of property rights.
If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in understanding the
statists' antagonism toward the gold standard.
As reprinted from the book "Capitalism, the Unknown Ideal"
by Ayn Rand
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with additional articles by Alan Greenspan - 1967.